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November 1997

Death Knell for the “Other Security” Deficiency Exception?
ROGER BERNHARDT
Irrational distinctions tend to be unreliable. That is nowhere more true than in the field of
deficiency judgments, where almost every statement made in one decision gets repudiated in
another. It has just happened again, with regard to the “other security” variant of the purchase
money antideficiency defense, with the result that one device that everyone thought was safe is
again in jeopardy.
The Purchase Money Prohibition (CCP §580b)
California law creates a series of obstacles to a lienholder seeking a deficiency judgment (i.e.,
a personal judgment against the defaulting trustor (borrower) of a secured real property loan for
the difference between the amount owed and the amount produced by a foreclosure sale of the
security for the debt). See California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice, chap 4 (2d ed Cal
CEB 1990). One of the antideficiency rules, CCP §580b, explicitly prohibits a deficiency
judgment against a borrower after the foreclosure sale of real property that secures a purchase
money loan. Code of Civil Procedure §580b defines purchase money as (1) a loan by a third
party lender used to pay all or part of the purchase price of a one-to-four unit residential dwelling
occupied in whole or in part by the buyer, or (2) a loan by the seller for the balance of the
purchase price of property sold to the buyer. Thus, the statute denies a deficiency judgment to
specified residential lenders, and to all sellers, whether they sold the buyer residential or
commercial property or raw land.
Like most statutes, CCP §580b gives no reasons for its results, but our courts seem to have an
overpowering urge to fill in missing reasons.
“Purposes” of CCP §580b
Brown v Jensen (1953) 41 C2d 193, 259 P2d 425, was the first opinion to ascribe purposes to
CCP §580b. Brown involved a senior lienholder who foreclosed, thus wiping out a seller’s junior
purchase money lien. Because the junior’s security was entirely destroyed and it no longer had a
lien on the property, it was a “sold-out” junior. The junior then tried to sue the trustor on the
note. Brown held that the junior’s action, although technically not an action for a deficiency
because the junior had not previously foreclosed, was the functional equivalent of an attempt to
obtain a deficiency judgment, and thus was barred by CCP §580b. Brown said the purposes of
CCP §580b were (1) to make the seller look only to the security for recovery of a purchase
money debt, and (2) to put the risk that the property’s value would become inadequate on the
seller because of its superior knowledge of the value of the security. The dissent, however,
contended that the statute’s purpose was to stop underbidding. Ten years later, in Roseleaf v
Chierighino (1963) 59 C2d 35, 27 CR 873, Justice Traynor maintained that all three of those
purposes were wrong: (1) The statement that the beneficiary must look only to the security was a
conclusion, not an explanation; (2) the legislature did not likely intend to base the buyer’s
protection on the seller’s superior knowledge; and (3) underbidding is deterred by fair value rules
(CCP §580a), not purchase money rules.
Roseleaf’s repudiation of Brown’s reasons might have been expected to lead to a contrary
result (i.e., not applying CCP §580b to a sold-out junior), but Justice Traynor decided to change
the reasons rather than the rule. The new purposes of CCP §580b, in his view, were to discourage
overvaluation and to prevent the aggravation of economic downturns resulting from deficiency

liability. Were it not for Justice Traynor’s great stature, these reasons would have been laughed
off long ago. As far as overvaluation is concerned, no seller reduces its price because it might be
barred from recovering a deficiency judgment; rather, it raises the price to compensate for that
risk. Additionally, the buyer is more inclined, rather than less, to accept an inflated price because
it has antideficiency protection. Regarding the antidepression theory, protecting the buyer at the
expense of the seller after a senior foreclosure merely shifts the loss from one to the other,
equally worsening any economic downturn (as the supreme court was itself to acknowledge later
in Spangler v Memel (1972) 7 C3d 603, 102 CR 807).
Variants and Purposes
Roseleaf accepted the Brown logic that CCP §580b barred a deficiency judgment for a soldout junior whose lien secured a purchase money loan. However, Roseleaf limited the logic to the
“standard” purchase money mortgage transaction (e.g., in which a seller takes back from the
buyer a note secured by the property that was sold). Because the sold-out junior (seller) in
Roseleaf decided to take back a note secured by other properties owned by the buyer instead of
the property sold, Roseleaf held that the transaction was a “variant” of the standard transaction.
The court reasoned that in variant transactions the purposes of CCP §580b are to be examined to
determine whether the statute should apply in that particular case. The Roseleaf court concluded
that CCP §580b did not bar the junior’s (seller’s) action on the note in this particular variant of
the standard transaction. This holding became known as the “other security” exception to CCP
§580b.
Justice Traynor’s economic notions as expressed in Roseleaf are able to survive because in
standard transactions CCP §580b is applied “automatically,” i.e., no one gets to argue that the
logic would not pass a high school economics course. In variant transactions, however, as noted
above, the purposes of CCP §580b are to be considered in finding the correct result. This is
where irrationality leads to instability.
Roseleaf was a variant in that the seller took back a deed of trust on other property, rather than
that which it sold to the buyer. Ordinary lay people might think that a seller who insists on
different property as security for the price of what was sold is more likely than not to be
overvaluing it, and that the effect on a depression is the same whether the buyer owes a
deficiency judgment after losing either parcel A (the sold property) or parcel B (other property).
However, in holding that the Roseleaf seller could recover on a purchase money note as a soldout junior, Justice Traynor held that the purposes went the other way for this variant.
If a variant can attain the same impregnable status as a standard transaction, we lawyers can
nonetheless work with it, despite its total absurdity: If deficiency protection is desired, the deed
of trust is put on the property sold; if deficiency exposure is wanted, then it should cover other
security instead. Indeed, such a strategy seemed almost recommended in another Traynor
opinion, Kistler v Vasi (1969) 71 C2d 261, 78 CR 170. (In Kistler, the buyer paid the seller’s
broker with a deed of trust from buyer directly to the broker, rather than give paper to the seller
to be assigned to the broker. The court allowed the broker to sue the buyer for a deficiency
judgment and rejected the buyer’s argument that, because the seller’s commission obligation was
discharged by giving the broker the buyer’s deed of trust, the transaction was in effect a purchase
money loan by the seller.)
The recent case of Conley v Matthes (1997) 56 CA4th 1453, 66 CR2d 518 (reported at 20
CEB RPLR 244 (Oct. 1997)), however, has shattered the supposedly settled “other security”
variant, and held that a variant may have feet of clay. In this case, Conley sold two properties to
Matthes, taking back a second deed of trust on one parcel to secure part of the price of the other
parcel. When a senior lien foreclosure wiped out Conley’s second, he sued as a sold-out junior,
claiming protection under the “other security variant.” He lost because, according to the Second

District Court of Appeal, the two sales were so closely related that “the ‘other’ property is not
really ‘other.’” 56 CA4th at 1463. Roseleaf was distinguished on the ground that the other
property in that case was “completely foreign to the transaction,” whereas the properties in
Conley were a package deal. 56 CA4th at 1464. Thus, the CCP §580b policies were held to lead
to protection rather than exposure for the buyer.
If other security must be “really other” to fit the Roseleaf variant, can deals be structured to fit
it? Conley’s analysis of “really other” security is too filled with moralisms and other extraneous
considerations to give the bar much help. The transaction was an integrated package at the
beginning, but by the time of closing it had broken down into two separate sales, the second sale
being entirely optional and independent of the first. We may surmise that any arrangement with
more integration than this (i.e., any extensive cross-referencing) may be called “not really other.”
I doubt, however, that we can predict how much less interrelation between the parcels is
sufficient to make it really “other security.” If the other security is, for instance, found to be
“necessary to the consummation of the sale” (56 CA4th at 1461) because the deal won’t close
otherwise, how likely is it that a court will regard it as “unrelated” and deny the buyer deficiency
protection?
As yet, there is no legal risk in taking other security to secure a seller’s note, even if that
security is later deemed related to the sold property. The arrangement may not help the seller, but
it should not hurt. (Who among us, however, is willing to wager against the possibility of a
decision coming down to the effect that a seller who takes other security rather than its own gets
no security interest whatsoever, or, worse, becomes a debtor rather than a creditor of the buyer?
That would surely deter overvaluation in some parallel universe.)

